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* Prepared for the World Bank’s Conference on the Political Economy of Distortions to 
Agricultural Incentives, 23-24 May 2008. While I was writing this paper, two giants of 
the agricultural economics profession, Bruce Gardner and Ed Schuh, passed away. I am 
grieved by their loss. They were gentlemen, scholars, and mentors to us all. They made 
important contributions to the subject matter of this article, as well. 
 
This Working Paper series is designed to promptly disseminate the findings of work in 
progress for comment before they are finalized. The views expressed are the authors’ 
alone and not necessarily those of the World Bank and its Executive Directors, nor the 
countries they represent, nor of the institutions providing funds for this research project.   1 
Simulating the Effects of Supply and Demand Elasticities  
on Political-Economic Equilibrium 
 
Wallace’s (1962) pioneering study brought to agricultural economics a focus on the role 
of supply and demand elasticities in determining the efficiency with which agricultural 
policy transfers income among interest groups.  His discussion provides key insights into 
what I call the “consequences of policy” side of current models of political economy.  
Becker’s (1983) and Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) models, both famously seminal in 
the political economy literature, have such “consequences” sides, and therefore when 
agricultural policy is examined in their models’ frameworks, market elasticities play key 
roles.  These two models have also “causes of policy” sides, which describe interest 
groups’ abilities to create political pressure (by controlling members’ free-riding, etc.).  
My aim is to provide a theoretical review and exposition of the effects of elasticities on 
redistributional efficiency, and in turn on distortional policies in political-economic 
equilibrium.  I demonstrate how models of actual political economies might be built and 
used to derive theoretical predictions about how market elasticities affect policy and 
income transfers.  Applying similar models to examine real-world political economies 
can provide testable hypotheses about how market parameters affect distortional policies.  
The Literature on the Political-economic Effects of Redistributive Efficiency 
Becker made interesting and provocative claims about his model’s results: 
PROPOSITION 2.  An increase in deadweight cost reduces the 
equilibrium subsidy.  (p. 381) 
 
CORROLARY.  Political policies that raise efficiency are more likely to 
be adopted than policies that lower efficiency.  (p. 384) 
 
… in the political sector … investments in human or physical capital 
specific to a firm, industry, or even region reduce the short-run elasticity 
of supply, and the deadweight costs of “distortions” are lower when 
supply (and demand) is less elastic.  (p. 383) 
 Grossman and Helpman (G&H) made related statements:   
… All else equal, industries with higher import demand or export supply 
elasticities (in absolute value) will have smaller ad valorem deviations 
from free trade.  This is true for two reasons.  First, the government may 
bear a political cost for creating deadweight loss…  To the extent that this 
is so, all else equal, it will prefer to raise contributions from sectors where 
the cost is small.  Second, the members of lobbies as a group will share in 
any deadweight loss that results from trade policy. (p. 842) 
 
I analyze and critique these claims, and suggest how models of political economies might 
be developed to empirically test the above hypotheses about the policies’ underlying 
causes. 
An “Economy” for Two Models of Political Economy 
Following the basics of Gardner (1983), I develop a simple economic model of typical 
agricultural policies, used later as part of two models of political economy.  Assume an 
economy with two goods: agricultural good, and composite good numeraire q2.  There are 
two groups of economic agents:  agricultural producers (“farmers”) and consumers-
taxpayers.  The consumer price of the agricultural good is p
d.  The producer price is p
s.  
Markets are competitive.  D(p
d, b) is the demand function for the agricultural good is: 
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, defined for p
d ≥ 0, where a0 > 0, a1 < 0.
i  (1) 
The demand curve is illustrated in figure 1 for particular parameter values a0´ and a1´. 
Farmers’ supply function S
*(p
s, b) is, 
= Max 0,Min b0 +b1p
s,q
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, where b0 < 0, b1 > 0.  (2) 
The supply function is illustrated in figure 1, with parameter values b0´ and b1´ in the 
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Figure 1.  A higher supply elasticity decreases a production subsidy’s redistributive efficiency.   
  3 I close the economic model by assuming that markets must clear in economic 







Equations (1)-(4) define economic equilibrium when there is no government intervention.  
From these we can find the equilibrium non-intervention price and quantity as functions 
of market parameters:  p
nieq(b) = (a0-b0)/(b1-a1), and q
nieq(b) = b0 + b1p
ni(b).   
The “Policy Consequences” Side of Two Models of Political Economy 
I define political-economic equilibrium in terms of market parameters, political 
parameters, and government policy. 
Economic Equilibrium under an Arbitrary Government Strategy 
Both Becker’s and G&H’s models are game-theoretical models of interest group 
competition for government transfers.  An interest group in my models is government, 
indexed by 0.  Government has two strategy variables:  a per-unit production tax (or 




ch = b0/b1 - a0/a1 > 0 is the “choke tax,” high enough to drive the quantity 
consumed and produced to zero;  t
vn is some very negative number representing a subsidy 
larger than the government would ever set in political-economic equilibrium. 
Generalizing (2) and (4), the quota’s impact on supply is shown in (5).  (When no 
quota is used, q = q
H, which makes (5) identical to (2).) 
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. 
From (4), the equilibrium producer price is the consumer price less the tax/subsidy:   
(6) p
s = p
d - t. 
When government does not use the tax/subsidy, (4) and (6) are the same condition.  For 
an arbitrary value of the vector of market parameters b = (a0, a1 b0, b1 q
H) and of 
government policy (t, q), economic equilibrium is determined by (1), (3), (5), and (6), 
which can be solved for prices and quantities in economic equilibrium, in terms of policy 
variables t and q, and market parameters b.  Call these solutions p
s(t, q, b), p
d(t, q, b),  q
s(t, q, b), and q
d(t, q, b).  Since markets clear, re-label q
s(t, q, b), and q
d(t, q, b), calling 
them both q
*(t, q, b).  In the upper panel of figure 1, the market parameter vector takes a 
particular value b´ = (a0´, a1´, b0´, b1´, q
H´), and policy levels are t
les < 0 and q´ < q
H´.   
Resulting equilibrium prices and quantity are p
s(t
les, q´, b´), p
d(t




Government’s Redistribution of Interest Group Welfare under a Production Subsidy 
I use consumer surplus plus production tax/subsidy revenues (negative if a subsidy) to 
measure group 1 welfare.  In equilibrium, u1 depends on policy and market parameters:  
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,  (7) 
where u  > 0 is an exogenous utility level and z is a dummy variable of integration.  1
ex
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I use producer surplus to measure the welfare of farmers: 




where u  > 0 is exogenous utility and z is a dummy variable of integration. The vector of 




1(t, q, b), u2(t, q, b)). 
Effects of Supply and Demand Elasticities on Redistributive Efficiency 
Following Wallace (1962) and Gardner (1983, 1987), I show how changes in market 
elasticities affect a production subsidy’s redistributive efficiency.  This framework will 
aid the analysis of the effects of elasticity changes on political-economic equilibrium.   
An Increased Supply Elasticity Decreases the Efficiency of a Production Subsidy 
The supply curve in the top panel has an elasticity of 2.0 around the point (q
nieq, p
ni) = 
(130, 2.60); the bottom panel’s supply curve has elasticity 3.2 around that point.  In the 
case of less elastic supply, the policy shown is (t
les, q
ni) = (-1.00, q
H), where q
H is some 
non-binding quota.  In the top panel this policy leads to a $3 supply price, a $2 demand 
price, and 170 units produced.  Producer surplus rises by ∆PS = $60, consumer surplus 
rises by ∆CS = $90, and taxes rise by ∆TX = $170.  Deadweight loss is DW = -(∆PS + 
∆CS - ∆TX) = $20.  Given the more elastic supply in the lower panel, to transfer $60 to producers as was done in the top panel requires a production subsidy of $1.275, resulting 
in a $2.975 producer price and a $1.70 demand price.  Consumer surplus rises by $144, 
but taxes rise by $242.25.  Deadweight is $38.25. Thus, with more elastic supply, for any 
given-sized transfer to producers the subsidy instrument becomes less efficient. 
The intuition behind the figure 1’s results is straightforward.  Deadweight results 
when a wedge is driven between the marginal benefit of consumption and marginal 
production cost.  A production subsidy lures into the sector resources more valuable 
outside the sector.  As resources enter, their marginal opportunity cost increases to the 
new price level.  The more elastic is supply, the easier resources enter.  Since the demand 
curve slopes downward, the greater production leads to a bigger distortional wedge, 
which must grow because the consumer price must drop to increase consumption. 
  6  
 















































Figure 2. An increased supply elasticity decreases the redistributive efficiency of a 
production subsidy and decreases the equilibrium transfer to producers in the Becker 
model, as shown in welfare-space.  (A similar diagram from the G&H model appears in 





























 ε=2.77)   8 
Redistributive efficiency can also be illustrated in welfare-space, with u1 and u2 
on the axes, as in figure 2, which reflects elements of Gardner (1983), Bullock (1994, 
1995, 1996), and Bullock and Salhofer (2003).  The curves are surplus transformation 
curves, introduced by Josling (1974).  For supply elasticities of ε´ = 0.85, 1.23, 1.62, 
2.00, 2.39, and 2.77, surplus transformation curves labeled h(t,q
ni,b
ε=ε´ ) show the welfare 
outcomes from a continuum of subsidy levels, assuming that the production quota is not 
employed, that parameters b0 and b1 are set at levels leading to a supply elasticity of ε´, 
and that a0 and a1 are set at their baseline levels, implying a demand elasticity of -4/3.  
For any ε´´ > ε´, and for any point on h(t,q
ni,b
ε=ε´´ ), there exists a Pareto superior point on 
h(t,q
ni,b
ε=ε´ ).  That is, a lower supply elasticity increases the efficiency of the subsidy 
instrument. 
More Elastic Demand Increases the Efficiency of a Production Subsidy 
More elastic demand raises the redistributive efficiency of a subsidy.  (See the appendix 
for a detailed discussion).  The subsidy increases production, which must be consumed.  
The more elastic is demand, the more readily consumers substitute the good for the other.  
Thus the marginal benefit of consuming the good does not change greatly as more of the 
good is consumed, and the wedge between marginal cost and marginal benefit remains 
small. 
Intuitive Discussion 
The results above suggest an explanation of why we might see agricultural price supports 
more often than price supports for industrial goods.  Land limitations inherently cause the 
supply elasticity of agricultural goods as a whole to be low.  But for certain industrial 
products—pencils, for example—there are few limiting factors.  Because new firms can 
enter to copy the practices of existing firms, then the production technology has nearly 
constant returns to scale in the relevant neighborhood.  Supporting the price of a pencil 
would lead to far greater pencil production.  For most people, the marginal value of 
owning yet another pencil is low once they already have some number of pencils.  So a 
pencil price support would lead to a large wedge between marginal costs and marginal 
benefits of pencils, and thus a large deadweight loss.  But agriculture is special because 
land is a prominent limiting factor of production.   This is a possible explanation of why 
subsidies tend to be provided for crops for which it is difficult to expand acreage.  The “Policy Causes” Sides of Two Models of Political Economy 
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Next I present two political-economy models, one like Becker’s (1983), the other like 
G&H’s (1994).  In both models, consumers-taxpayers have one political strategy 
variable, political expenditures x1.  They use x1 to influence government’s choices.
ii  
Assume that it is technically feasible for group 1 to make political expenditures within X1 
= [0,  ].  Similarly, producers have X2 = [0,  ].   
A Becker Model 
Becker presents a one-shot, non-cooperative Nash game in political expenditures.  
“Government” in Becker’s model is not quite an economic agent, but a type of “machine” 
with no real independent will or objective.  Government policies are determined by the 
“political pressures” of non-governmental interest groups, which in turn depend on their 
strategies.
iii  This dependence is characterized by function I(x1, x2, k), where k is a vector 
of influence parameters, to be discussed later.
iv  I assume the following functional form: 
.   
When I is positive, government transfers utility from group 1 to group 2 and vice-versa 
when I is negative.  In the baseline version of the Becker model, I set k = (0, -1.7, 2.5, 
0.01, -0.01, -0.0025), which, letting subscripts denote partial derivatives, results in I1 > 0, 
I11 < 0, I2 < 0, and I22 > 0, implying satisfaction of the second-order conditions in 
Becker’s (1983) appendix,
v and leading to an a transfer group 1 to group 2. 
I can conveniently and without loss of generality define the “size of government,” 
Z, as group 1’s utility loss (negative if group 1 gains) due to the government’s policy: 
(9)  . 
With the influence function in (9) and the government-size function in (10), now I 
can link the economic sub-model with the political sub-model.  This is accomplished by 
assuming that in political economic equilibrium the size of the government that is called 
for by politics must equal the size of the government that is brought about by policy: 
I = (10)  Z.   
To apply Becker’s political model to an economic model of agricultural policy, I 
assume that government can only use the tax/subsidy.  So in (1) and (5)-(11), q is 
replaced by q





1, t, Z, I, x1, and x2.  Under the conditions of the implicit function theorem, in principal 





d, u1, t, Z, and I, denote these solutions f
#(x1, x2, b, k).  It can be shown that,  
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where α = b1a1(a1-b1/2)/(b1-a1)
2, and β = a1q
ni/(b1-a1).  Substituting this function for t 
throughout the model, we can obtain economic-equilibrium functions:  p
s#(x1, x2, b, k), 
p
d#(x1, x2, b, k), q
s#(x1, x2, b, k), q
d#(x1, x2, b, k), u1
#(x1, x2, b, k), and u2
#(x1, x2, b, k).
vi
We can write consumer-taxpayer welfare and producer welfare (both net of 
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∫ − x2
In the non-cooperative equilibrium, each group each group i = 1, 2 solves 
(14)  . 
Xi
vi x1,x2,b,k ()
Assuming interior solutions, taking derivatives in (13) and (14) gives the following first 



































































































The system of equations (16) and (17) has two unknowns, and in principal can be solved 
for those unknowns as functions of the parameters.  The solutions are political 
expenditures of the non-governmental interest groups in political-economic equilibrium: 
,  .  Substituting these functions into the economic equilibrium 
government policy function gets us the political-economic equilibrium government 
policy function: t
x1




e b,k () ,x2
e b,k () ,b,k (
e b,k () ≡ ).  Then substituting this function into the 
other economic equilibrium functions, we finish solve for the political-economic 
equilibrium:  f
e(b, k) ≡ f
#( , , b, k), for f = p x1
e b,k () x2
e b,k ()







d, u1 u2, I, and Z. 
Figure 3 illustrates political-economic equilibrium in what I will call the baseline 
Becker model.  Using a superscript 0 to denote baseline values, the model’s baseline 
parameter vector is (b
0, k







0,k  = (910/3, -200/3, -130, 
100, 910/3, -1.7,  2.5,   0.01, -0.01, -0.0025).  These parameter values imply that in the 
non-intervention economic equilibrium, the elasticity of supply is 2, the demand elasticity 
is -4/3, price is $1.30/unit, and 130 units are supplied and demanded.  The values also 
ensure satisfaction of conditions for the function I( ) in Becker’s appendix. 




0) = -$0.6076 per unit.  The welfare effect (gross of political expenditures) of 
the this subsidy is shown by the movement from the baseline non-intervention point
vii u
ni 




0) = (658.07, 434.55).  The resultant consumer-taxpayer loss 




0) =  $700.00 - $658.07 = $41.93, the gross producer gain is ∆u1
e(b
0, k
0) = $434.55 - 
$400.00 = $34.55.  Deadweight loss
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Figure 3.  Nash equilibrium in the baseline Becker model of a production tax/subsidy. 
 


























































0) A Grossman and Helpman Model 
G&H’s (1994) model assumes two types of interest groups, lobbying and non-lobbying.  
A political parameter, here denoted γ, establishes a weight that is used to characterize the 
degree to which lobbying influences government.  L denotes the set of lobbying groups.  
The political influences on government cause it to set the policy that it would when 
maximizing “political preference function” that grants a weight of γ to non-lobbying 
groups and a weight of 1 + γ to lobbying groups (see their (11)):  
  13 
t max γ h j t,q
ni,b () ∑ + 1+γ () h j t,q
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. 
Assuming that consumers-taxpayers do not lobby but farmers do, the problem reduces to  
t max γh1 t,q
ni,b () + 1+ γ () h2 t,q
ni,b () { }.   
Calling t
GHe the political-economic equilibrium policy, the maximization problem above 
implies that it will depend on the market parameters b and the lone political parameter, γ: 












That is, the equilibrium policy takes the welfare outcome (gross of political expenditures) 
to that place on the surplus transformation curve with slope –γ/(1 + γ).   
Two other equations are necessary to define equilibrium.  A focal policy in the 
model is t
Not2, that policy that would come about in political-economic equilibrium were 
group 2 never to lobby.  Policy t
Not2 must satisfy (see G&H’s (16)): 
∂h2 t











In the particular model presented here, t
Not2(b) equals the non-intervention value, 0.  This 
G&H model is closed by (20), which determines the lobbying group’s political 
expenditures,   (see G&H’s (17)):
 ix     14 
x2
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The economic side of the G&H model at its baseline is identical to that of the 
Becker model at its baseline, as presented in equations (1), (3), and (5)-(8), where the 
market parameter values are b
0 = ( ) = (910/3, -200/3, -130, 100).  The G&H 
model has only a single political parameter, γ.  Given the nature of our simulative model, 
the value set for γ is relatively arbitrary.  For ease of comparison with the Becker model, 
from (19) I calibrate γ by setting -γ/(1+γ) equal to the slope of the surplus transformation 
curve when the elasticity of supply is 2.00 and the elasticity of demand is -4/3.  (This 
slope is -0.717488, the slope at point u
ε=2.00 in figure 2.  The resulting γ is γ
0  = 2.53967, 
and so  (b
0, k
0) = (  = (910/3, -200/3, -130, 100, 2.53967.)  Given these 
values, the per-unit subsidy and gross transfers in the baseline G&H model are equal to 
those of the baseline Becker model.   
Comment [OU2]: 
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The Comparative Statics of Changes in Market Elasticities 
With the economic model formulated and the effect of elasticities on redistributive 
efficiency illustrated, I can ask my central question in an abstract and compact form:  
What is ∇t
e(b, k)?  That is, what are the partial derivatives of the equilibrium distortional 
policy with respect to the model’s parameters?  Related to this question is what is 
∇∆u
e(b, k)?  That is, what are the partial derivatives of the equilibrium transfers with 
respect to the model’s parameters?  Answering these questions of theory may be a useful 
step in developing testable hypotheses about why various nations use various distortional 
policies and make different levels of transfers among interest groups. 
Effects of Market Elasticities on the Total Subsidy 
The redistributional consequences (in the Becker model’s political-economic 
equilibrium) of changes in the supply elasticity are shown in figure 2, where six “gross-












ε=ε´ ).  As the 
supply elasticity falls, the equilibrium gross welfare outcome moves northwest.  Since the 
transfer to producers when the supply elasticity is ε´ is the vertical distance between u
ε=ε´, 
and u
ni, then the gross transfer to producers increases as demand becomes less elastic.  
The relationship between the total subsidy and the supply elasticity is also shown in the 
lower right-hand panel of figure 4, where as the supply elasticity rises, the total subsidy 
falls.  Similar comparative static results come about in the G&H model:  as supply 
becomes more elastic, the total subsidy falls.  These results are in keeping with the tenor 
of the literature, which is that when redistributional efficiency decreases, total transfers 
fall. 
 





























Figure 4.  In the Becker model’s equilibrium, as demand becomes more elastic, the per-
unit subsidy decreases, whereas in G&H’s model, it decreases.  Raising the supply 
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Becker   16 
elasticity lowers the equilibrium per-unit subsidy in the G&H model, but the effect in the 
Becker model depends on the elasticity’s initial value. In both models’ equilibria, the 
total producer subsidy rises as demand becomes more elastic, but falls as supply becomes 
more elastic. 
How net-of-political-expenditures welfare outcomes in the Becker model change 








ε=ε´ ) for the elasticity of supply being ε´ = 0.85, 1.23, 1.62, 2.00, 2.38, 
and 2.77.  Whether the question is about producer welfare gross-of- or net-of-political-
expenditures, the producers’ welfare outcome in political-economic equilibrium improves 
as supply becomes less elastic and redistributive efficiency improves.  This result is also 
in line with the general tenor of the literature.  A figure in the appendix shows that the 
same holds true for changes in the demand elasticity; redistributive efficiency improves 
as demand becomes more elastic, and producers are better off in political-economic 
equilibrium.  In every case, the net-of-political-expenditures welfare outcome is Pareto 
inferior to the non-intervention outcome.  That is, it would be better for everybody if it 
were impossible for everybody to make political expenditures.  This is very much in line 
with Tullock’s (1967, 1980) discussion of rent dissipation and the literature that has 
followed (e.g., Krueger 1974, Hillman 1989, Coggins 1995, Bullock and Rutström 2007).  
Effects of Market Elasticities on the Per-unit Subsidy  
I have reported above that in both political-economy models, the comparative static 
results of how changes in demand and supply elasticities affect total subsidies is 
consistent with predictions in the literature.  This type of result also holds for the per-unit 
subsidy in the political-economic equilibria of the G&H model.  As illustrated in the 
upper-left hand panel of figure 4, as demand becomes more elastic (making redistribution 
more efficient), the G&H model’s equilibrium per-unit subsidy rises.  Similarly, as 
supply becomes more elastic and makes redistribution less efficient, G&H’s equilibrium 
per-unit subsidy falls, as shown in figure 4’s upper right-hand panel.  But in the Becker 
model, the direction of the effect of changes in elasticities on the per-unit subsidy is 
much less in keeping with the literature’s predictions.  The upper left-hand panel of 
figure 4 shows how in Becker’s model the per-unit subsidy depends on the initial value of 
the supply elasticity.  Beginning at a low supply elasticity, raising the elasticity actually 
raises the per-unit subsidy, which is contrary to the discussion in the literature.  Similarly,   17 
the upper left-hand panel shows that as demand becomes less elastic (implying that 
redistributive efficiency improves), the per-unit subsidy for the Becker model falls.  This 
result runs contrary to the discussion in the literature, which anticipates that the extent to 
which a policy instrument is used should increase with increases in its redistributive 
efficiency. 
Using figure 2, an intuitive explanation can be provided of the Becker model’s 
unexpected result that a policy may be used less after its redistributive efficiency rises.  
Note that an increase in redistributive efficiency does increase the total transfer.  For 
example, the point labeled u
ε=0.85 is the equilibrium welfare outcome (gross of political 
expenditures) when the elasticity of supply is 0.85.  This point lies further to northwest of 
the non-intervention point u
ni than does u
ε=1.62, the equilibrium welfare (gross of political 
expenditures) point when the supply elasticity is 1.62.  That is, when redistribution is 
relatively efficient, the total subsidy is larger, and the total transfer from consumers-
taxpayers is larger.  However, the increased efficiency makes it possible to transfer any 
amount to producers by using a smaller per-unit subsidy; and this is exactly what happens 
in equilibrium:  more is transferred in total, but with a smaller per-unit subsidy.  As in 
figure 4, when ε = 0.85 a total subsidy of $49.98 is generated by a per-unit subsidy of 
$0.593; when ε = 1.62, producers receive $39.20 from a per-unit subsidy of $0.614. 
Conclusions and Implications for Empirical Work 
My analysis highlights a number of points regarding Becker’s and G&H’s statements.  
First, when discussing the effects of supply and demand elasticities on distortions and 
transfers, it is important to distinguish carefully between per-unit transfers and total 
transfers, as well as between per-unit distortions (per-unit deadweight loss) and total 
distortions (total deadweight loss).  Second, Becker’s statement that the deadweight costs 
of distortions are lower when supply (and demand) is less elastic is not completely 
correct and must be interpreted with care.  How an elasticity change effects the 
deadweight costs of distortions depends very much on the type of policy instrument(s) 
used.  (Gardner 1983, 1987 makes this point clear).  I have shown an example in which a 
production subsidy is the policy instrument used, and a lower supply elasticity does 
indeed lead to less deadweight loss for any amount of income transferred to producers.  
In turn, a greater total subsidy is provided in Becker’s political-economic equilibrium.   18 
The results just discussed and summarized in table 1 reveal challenges that remain 
as economists try to determine the effects of market parameter changes on a political- 
economy’s choices.  The theoretical results are not as cut-and-dry as some of the 
literature has anticipated.  This ambiguity in theoretical results implies that some of the 
answers to the questions being asked about the effects of redistributive efficiency on 
policy in political-economic equilibrium must be answered empirically.  Hypotheses can 
be tested.  Do higher supply elasticities lead to less use of production subsidies, or greater 
use?  Results in this article illustrate that no unambiguous theoretical answer has been 
reached, and therefore there is a need for empirical analysis to guide us towards a better 
understanding of which models of political economy are the more realistic.  Of course, 
the simulations reported here come from a very simple economic model, with two interest 
groups, and one policy instrument used.  Real political economies have many interest 
groups, who have many strategy variables, and interact with governments that can use 
multiple policy instruments simultaneously. It would not have been possible in this brief 
space to report the simulation results from models of the many “real” political economies.  
But I have provided general guidelines for how an economic model and a political model 
can be joined to create a model of political economy, which then can be used as a 
theoretical basis for empirical work.  The next step is to build such a model for a real-
world political economy.  Such a model might include several interest groups, multiple 
producer groups from different regions of a nation, an urban consumer/laborer group, and 
a group of government bureaucrats.  The model might also include several linked 
markets.  Simulations could be run with the developed model of political economy, to 
begin to generate ideas about which economic and political parameters might be key in 
the political-economic process.  Then empirical work, estimating the economic model, 
the size of observed transfers, and the values of observed policies, would be conducted to 









Table 1.  The effects of elasticity changes on total subsidization and per-unit 
subsidization in the equilibria of two models of political economy 
 
Becker Model  G&H Model  Elasticity 
change 
















Less efficient  Smaller  Ambiguous—
depends on 
the initial 






More efficient  Larger  Smaller  Larger  Larger 
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 Appendix: Simulating the Effects of  
Supply and Demand Elasticities on Political-Economic Equilibrium 
 
1.  Finding t as a function of ∆u1. 
From equations (8) and (11), we have 
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When government can only use the production tax/subsidy policy instrument, then the 
quota is held constant at q
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Using the quadratic formula, 
(A.5) 
−β ± β
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 From (A.5) it can be shown that the tax t
* = -β/2α corresponds to a point like E in figure 
3.  That is, for any greater than t
*, not only producers but also consumers-taxpayers are 
harmed by a further increase in t.  We assume that no t higher than t
* can be part of a 
political economic equilibrium.  This implies that the only one of the two solutions to 
(A.5) that can be part of an economic equilibrium is: 











Therefore in political economic equilibrium t depends on -∆u1 as follows: 
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2.  Mappings from Policy-space to Welfare-space. 
The vector function u can be used to map the feasible policy set X0 or a subset of it into 
welfare space (defined here as the nonnegative orthant of two-dimensional Euclidean 
space, with u1 on the horizontal axis and u2 on the vertical axis).  Such mappings will 
prove important in my presentation of political economy models, and so I present them in 
some detail here.  Given that the economy is characterized by some a value b´ of the 
vector of parameters b, using the welfare vector function u(t, q, b´) to map all of the 
feasible policy set into welfare space, we obtain the set of feasible welfare outcomes {u(t, 
q, b´): (t, q) ∈ X0}.  We will give this set the name h(t, q, b´), where no superscripts on 
the policy variables imply that each can take on any feasible value.  h(t, q, b´) is the set of 
all the welfare outcomes that government can bring about with its available policies, 
given that the economy is always in economic equilibrium.  This mapping is illustrated in 
figure A.3.1, where the shaded feasible policy set X0 is shown mapped into the shaded set 
of feasible welfare outcomes h(t, q, b´).  Because two policy instrument variables are 
allowed to change in this mapping, h(t, q, b´) is a two-dimensional manifold in welfare 
space.
x   
Another such mapping occurs when a single policy, that is a single point in X0, is 
mapped into a point welfare space.  This is illustrated in figure 2, where the non-
intervention policy shown as (t
ni, q
ni) in the lower panel is mapped by function u(t, q, b´) 
to the set h(t
ni, q
ni, b´) in the upper panel.
xi  Because no policy instruments vary in this 
mapping, the result is a manifold of degree zero (a point) in welfare space. 
Another such mapping takes the dashed line segment running from triangle A to 
triangle B in the lower panel of figure 2, and results in the dashed surplus transformation   25 
curve
xii running from triangle A to triangle B in the upper panel.  Note that because the 
dashed line segment runs through the point (t
ni, q
ni), then the dashed surplus 
transformation curve h(t, q
ni, b´) must contain the single element of h(t
ni, q
ni, b´).
xiii    
Just as we drew a surplus transformation curve for the tax/subsidy, we can also 
draw one for the production quota.  The function u(t, q, b´) takes the solid line segment 
running from circle C to circle D in the lower panel of figure 2, and results in the solid 
curve running from circle C to circle D in the upper panel.  Note that in places this 
production quota surplus transformation curve is positively sloped.  The intuition is that 
once the production quota is less than the quantity that would be chosen by a profit-
maximizing monopolist (which would take itself to the “top” of h(t
ni, q, b´), further 
reduction in quantity would not only hurt consumers, but also producers. 
The concavity (relative to the horizontal axis) of the surplus transformation curves 
shown in figure 2 relates to the dead weight costs that often accompany government 
policy that redistributes welfare.  Taking an arbitrary point, say (t´, q´) in X0 and mapping 
it to the corresponding welfare outcome h(t´, q´, b´) in the upper panel of figure 2, the 
horizontal (or vertical) distance from a h(t´, q´, b´) to the 45-degree line through the non-
intervention welfare outcome h(t
ni, q
ni, b
´) is a measure of dead weight loss.  This 
distance is denoted DW(t´, q´, b´).  (Gardner (1983) provides a discussion.)  The 
concavity of the surplus transformation curves presented relates to how dead weight loss 
(think of the Harberger triangle) not only grows as a tax, subsidy, or production quota 
further distorts an economy, but grows at a greater rate as the distortion is increased.  
Thus, moving “northwest” along a surplus transformation curve, the distance from the 
curve to the 45-degree line through h(t
ni, q
ni, b´) increases.   26 
3.  Mappings from Policy-space to Welfare-space 
The vector function u can be used to map the feasible policy set X0 or a subset of it into 
welfare space (defined here as the nonnegative orthant of two-dimensional Euclidean 
space, with u1 on the horizontal axis and u2 on the vertical axis).  Such mappings are 
important in my presentation of political economy models, and so I present them in some 
detail here.  Given that the economy is characterized by some arbitrary value b´ of the 
vector of market parameters b, using the welfare vector function u(t, q, b´) to map all of 
the feasible policy set into welfare space, I obtain the set of feasible welfare outcomes 
{u(t, q, b´): (t, q) ∈ X0}.  I give this set the name h(t, q, b´), where no superscripts on the 
policy variables imply that each can take on any feasible value.  This is the set of all the 
welfare outcomes that government can bring about with its available policies, given that 
the economy is always in economic equilibrium.  This mapping is illustrated in figure 
A.3.1, where the shaded feasible policy set X0 is shown mapped into the shaded set of 
feasible welfare outcomes h(t, q, b´).  Because two policy instrument variables are 
allowed to change during this mapping, h(t, q, b´) is a two-dimensional manifold in 
welfare space. 
Another such mapping occurs when a single policy, that is a single point in X0, is 
mapped into a point welfare space.  This is illustrated in figure A.3.1, where the non-
intervention policy shown as (t
ni, q
ni) in the lower panel is mapped by function u(t, q, b´) 
to the set h(t
ni, q
ni, b´) in the upper panel.
xiv  Because no policy instruments vary in this 
mapping, the result is a manifold of degree zero (a point) in welfare space. 
Another such mapping takes the dashed line segment running from triangle A to 
triangle B in the lower panel of figure A.3.1, and results in the dashed curve running from   27 
triangle A to triangle B in the upper panel.  Josling (1974) was the first to discuss policy 
outcomes using such a curve, and Gardner (1983) popularized the analytic tool, naming 
such curves surplus transformation curves, since they illustrate how a single policy 
instrument can be used to “transform” one interest group’s welfare into another’s.  
Surplus transformation curves are one-dimensional manifolds in welfare space, created 
by varying one policy instrument’s level between its lower and upper limits while 
holding constant all other policy instruments’ levels.
xv   Note that because the dashed line 
segment runs through the point (t
ni, q
ni), then the dashed surplus transformation curve h(t, 
q
ni, b´) must contain the single element of h(t
ni, q
ni, b´). 
Figure A.3.1 also shows a surplus transformation curve for a production quota.  
The function u(t, q, b´) takes the solid line segment running from circle C to circle D in 
the lower panel of figure A.3.1, and results in the solid curve running from circle C to 
circle D in the upper panel.  Note that in places this production quota surplus 
transformation curve is positively sloped.  The intuition is that once the production quota 
is less than the quantity that would be chosen by a profit-maximizing monopolist (which 
would take itself to the “top” of h(t
ni, q, b´), further reduction in quantity would not only 
hurt consumers, but also producers. 
The concavity (relative to the horizontal axis) of the surplus transformation curves 
shown in figure A.3.1 relates to the dead weight costs that often accompany government 
policy that redistributes welfare.  Taking an arbitrary point, say (t´, q´) in X0 and mapping 
it to the corresponding welfare outcome h(t´, q´, b´) in the upper panel of figure 2, the 
horizontal (or vertical) distance from a h(t´, q´, b´) to the 45-degree line through the non-
intervention welfare outcome h(t
ni, q
ni, b
´) is a measure of dead weight loss.  This   28 
distance is denoted DW(t´, q´, b´).  (Gardner (1983) provides a discussion.)  The 
concavity of the surplus transformation curves presented relates to how dead weight loss 
(think of the Harberger triangle) not only grows as a tax, subsidy, or production quota 
further distorts an economy, but grows at a greater rate as the distortion is increased.  
Thus, moving “northwest” along a surplus transformation curve, the distance from the 
curve to the 45-degree line through h(t
ni, q
ni, b´) increases. 
 
4.  The Effects of Changes in Market Elasticities 
The Effect of Changes in Market Elasticities on the Redistributive Efficiency of the 
Production Subsidy Policy Instrument 
It was shown in the main text that increasing the supply elasticity decreases the 
redistributive efficiency of the production subsidy policy instrument.  The effects of 
changes in the demand elasticity on the subsidy instrument’s redistributive efficiency are 
detailed here.  A rise in the (absolute value of) the elasticity of demand raises the 
redistributive efficiency of the subsidy policy instrument.  Again, this can be shown in 
(quantity, price)-space or in welfare-space. 
As Seen in (Quantity, Price)-Space 
The effect of the elasticity of demand on redistributive efficiency of the subsidy is 
illustrated in (quantity, price)-space in figure A.4.1.  The intuitive explanation is 
reasonably straightforward.  One of the main determinants of elasticity in demand is the 
substitutability of the good with other goods.  The subsidy increases production, and that 
production must be consumed.  If demand is relatively elastic, then consumers readily 
substitute the good in question for other goods.  Thus the marginal benefit of consuming   29 
the good does not change greatly as more of the good is consumed, and the wedge 
between marginal cost and marginal benefit remains small.  In figure A.4.1, the same 
amount of surplus, ∆PS = 60, is transferred to producers in both panels.  But in the 
bottom panel, demand becoming less elastic leads to a greater loss in consumer-and-
taxpayer surplus and greater deadweight loss. 
As Seen in Welfare-Space 
Figure A.4.2 illustrates in welfare-space the effects of changes in the elasticity of demand 
on the redistributive efficiency of a production subsidy.  As demand becomes more 
elastic, the subsidy’s surplus transformation curve shifts northeast, implying for any level 
of transfer 
 
Effects of Changes in Market Elasticities on Welfare, the Total Subsidy, and the 
Per-unit Subsidy in Political-economic Equilibrium 
Changes in the Supply Elasticity 
In the Becker Model 
The effects of changes in the supply elasticity on welfare, the total subsidy, and the per-
unit subsidy in the Becker model’s political-economic equilibrium are discussed in detail 
in the main text.   
In the Grossman and Helpman Model 
The effects of changes in the supply elasticity in the Grossman and Helpman model’s 
political-economic equilibrium differ from those in the Becker model in some important 
aspects.  The effects on the total subsidy in the G&H model are shown in figure A.4.3.     30 
As with the Becker model, an increased supply elasticity decreases the redistributive 
efficiency of a production subsidy and decreases the total subsidy.  But unlike in the 
Becker model, the effects on the per-unit subsidy are uniformly consistent with the 
discussion in the literature:  as the supply elasticity increases, the per-unit subsidy 
declines. 
Changes in the Demand Elasticity 
The comparative static effects of a change in the demand elasticity depend on which 
political-economy model is used.  In the following I first discuss the effects in the Becker 
model, and then in the G&H model after that. 
In the Becker Model 
Figure A.4.2 illustrates the comparative static effects of changes in the demand elasticity 
on welfare in the Becker model.  Redistributive efficiency improves as demand becomes 
more elastic, and producers become better off in political economic equilibrium as this 
redistributive efficiency improves.  Note also that in any of these programs, the net-of-
political-expenditures welfare outcome is Pareto inferior to the non-intervention outcome.  
That is, it would be better for everybody if it were impossible for everybody to make 
political expenditures.  This is very much in line with Tullock’s (1967, 1980) discussion 
of rent dissipation and literature that has followed it (e.g., Krueger 1974, Hillman 1989, 
Coggins 1995, Bullock and Rutström 2007 ). 
When demand becomes more elastic, income can be more efficiently transferred 
to producers through the production subsidy instrument, in the sense that for any amount 
of income transferred to producers, the loss to consumers/taxpayers is lower under a more 
elastic demand than under a less elastic demand.  In the equilibrium of the Becker model,   31 
his increased efficiency results in a greater total subsidy to producers.  This is the result 
largely anticipated in the literature.  However the effect of a more elastic demand on the 
per-unit subsidy is the opposite of what is predicted in the literature:  as seen in figure as 
demand becomes more elastic, the per-unit subsidy decreases.  When demand is more 
elastic, it is possible to transfer more to producers while driving a smaller wedge between 
the marginal cost of producing the good and the marginal benefit of demanding it. 
In the Grossman and Helpman Model 
The effects of changes in the demand elasticity on the total subsidy in the Grossman and 
Helpman model are shown in the lower left-had panel of figure 4 and in figure A.4.4.  
Results are similar to those from the Becker model:  as demand grows more elastic, the 
transfer efficiency increases, and the size of the total subsidy increases with it.  In the 
upper left-hand panel of figure 4 it is shown that as demand becomes more elastic, the 
per-unit subsidy increases in the G&H equilibrium.  This result is in keeping with the 
general tone of the existing literature, whereas Becker model’s result for the per-unit 





























Figure A.3.1.  Mappings from policy instrument space into welfare space
xvi
h(t,q
ni,b´), surplus transformation 
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Figure A.3.2.  As demand becomes more elastic, the redistributive efficiency of a 
production subsidy increases 
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Figure A.3.3.  Demand becoming more elastic increases the redistributive efficiency of a 
production subsidy and increases the equilibrium transfer to producers in the Becker 
































































Figure A.3.4.  An increased supply elasticity decreases the redistributive efficiency of a 
production subsidy and decreases the equilibrium transfer to producers in the Grossman 
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Figure A.3.5. In the Grossman and Helpman model’s equilibrium, as demand becomes 
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i The complete economic sub-model will have seven parameters, which are the elements 
of vector b = (a0, a1, b0, b1, q
H, u , ).  For notational convenience, we write any 
function that depends on any of these seven parameters as dependent upon b. 
ii Formally, in Becker interest groups choose political contribution schedules, which are 
not real numbers but rather real-valued functions of government policy.  But in essence, 
by choosing a schedule they simultaneously choose a level of contribution. 
iii Nonetheless, I treat government as a “player,” because it makes it easier to compare 
and contrast the Becker model with the G&H-type model that I present later in the paper. 
iv Though Becker’s model actually presents a separate influence function for each group, 
eventually in the model he sets one identically equal to the negative of the other, so we 
can achieve the same results using only one influence function in the model.  Becker’s 
model only deals with I being positive, but it is easy to slightly modify the framework 
letting I be positive or negative. 
v I also set k such that each group’s best-response curve slopes upward and such that the 
relative slopes of the groups’ best-response curves are like those pictured in Becker’s 
figure I (p. 379), with the taxed group’s (group 1’s) best-response curve being steeper 
than the subsidized group’s, given that taxed group’s strategy variable is on the horizontal 
axis. 
vi For notational convenience we can refer to the function I(x1, x2, k),  as I
#(x1, x2, b, k), 
though these represent the same function. 
vii It can be seen that in non-intervention the equilibrium utility level for 
consumers/taxpayers changes as the supply and demand parameters change.  But none of 
the important elements of my discussion depends on the constant u .  Therefore, in order 
to keep the non-intervention equilibrium welfare point unchanged, I alter the u  term 
(and similarly  ), so that the non-intervention equilibrium welfare outcome is always 
) = (700, 400).  This makes it easier to use surplus transformation curves to 
visually compare the relative redistribution efficiencies of policies, since then all the 
surplus transformation curves pass through (700, 400).    39 
                                                                                                                                                 
viii Deadweight is shown as the horizontal (or vertical) distance between the gross welfare 
outcome (658.07, 434.55) and the 45-degree line passing through u
ni (Gardner 1983). 
ix That is, when applied to a two-group model in which only one group lobbies, the G&H 
framework implies that the lobbying group is willing to spend on lobbying an amount the 
size of their equilibrium gross-of-political-expenditures welfare, less γ times the 
deadweight loss resultant from the intervention.  The result is that producers’ political 
expenditures are almost as large as their gross welfare, and so net welfare for the 
lobbying group in equilibrium is almost zero, as is illustrated in the appendix. 
x An intuitive explanation of the shape of the surplus transformation curve of the 
production tax/subsidy is as follows.  We have stated that in principal t can be either 
positive (a tax) or negative (a subsidy).  Increasing the production subsidy (making a 
negative t more negative) always increases producer welfare and decreases consumer 
welfare (The supply price rises.  But the increases in taxes paid by consumers taxpayers 
dominates the increase in consumer surplus when the demand price falls.)  Increasing a 
production tax is always bad for producers.  Starting from a zero tax and increasing it 
marginally, consumers-taxpayers must gain, because the increase in tax revenues paid out 
to them dominates the decrease in consumer surplus caused by the rise in the demand 
price.  As the per-unit tax is further increased, however, eventually tax revenues can fall 
(a Laffer-effect).  Thus, when the production tax is sufficiently high, increasing can harm 
both producers and consumers-taxpayers.  In figure 3, when the tax rises beyond the point 
that results in welfare outcome E, both consumers-taxpayers and producers are harmed 
by a further tax increase. 
 
xi Our notation distinguishes between the point u(t
ni, q
ni, b´) and the set whose single 
element is that point: h(t
ni, q
ni, b´) = {u(t, q, b´): (t, q) = (t
ni, q
ni)}.  In figure 3, we label   40 
                                                                                                                                                 
the set h(t
ni, q
ni, b´), not the point u(t
ni, q
ni, b´).  It so happens that because our model is 
one of competitive equilibrium in a closed economy with externalities, the conditions of 
the first theorem of welfare economics are met, and non-intervention by government is 
Pareto efficient.  Thus, the non-intervention welfare outcome is on the Pareto frontier in 
figure 3.  Of course, non-intervention need not be Pareto efficient in economies in which 
the conditions of the first fundamental theorem are not met.  It also so happens that in our 
model the Pareto frontier is linear with a slope of -1.  This happens because the 
production quota and production tax/subsidy can be combined to transfer income without 
deadweight loss.  (See Just (1984) and Bullock and Salhofer (2003).) 
xii Josling (1974) was the first to discuss policy outcomes using such a curve, and Gardner 
(1983) popularized the analytic tool, using the term surplus transformation curves, since 
they illustrate how a single policy instrument can be used to “transform” one interest 
group’s welfare into another’s.  Surplus transformation curves are one-dimensional 
manifolds in welfare space, created by varying one policy instrument’s level between its 
lower and upper limits while holding constant all other policy instruments’ levels. 
xiii We are abusing notation slightly, letting h(t, q
ni, b´)  represent both a set and a curve. 
xiv My notation distinguishes between the point u(t
ni, q
ni, b´) and the set whose single 
element is that point: h(t
ni, q
ni, b´) = {u(t, q, b´): (t, q) = (t
ni, q
ni)}.  In figure A.3.1, I label 
the set h(t
ni, q
ni, b´), not the point u(t
ni, q
ni, b´).  It so happens that because the model is 
one of competitive equilibrium in a closed economy with externalities, the conditions of 
the first theorem of welfare economics are met, and non-intervention by government is 
Pareto efficient.  Thus, the non-intervention welfare outcome is on the Pareto frontier in 
figure A.3.1.  Of course, non-intervention need not be Pareto efficient in economies in   41 
                                                                                                                                                 
which the conditions of the first fundamental theorem are not met.  In this particular 
model the Pareto frontier is linear with a slope of -1.  This happens because the 
production quota and production tax/subsidy can be combined to transfer income without 
deadweight loss.  (See Just (1984) and Bullock and Salhofer (2003).) 
xv I are abusing notation slightly, letting h(t, q
ni, b´)  represent both a set and a curve. 
xvi An intuitive explanation of the shape of the surplus transformation curve of the 
production tax/subsidy is as follows.  I have stated that in principal t can be either 
positive (a tax) or negative (a subsidy).  Increasing the production subsidy (making a 
negative t more negative) always increases producer welfare and decreases consumer 
welfare (The supply price rises.  But the increases in taxes paid by consumers-taxpayers 
dominates the increase in consumer surplus when the demand price falls.)  Increasing a 
production tax is always bad for producers.  Starting from a zero tax and increasing it 
marginally, consumers-taxpayers must gain, because the increase in tax revenues paid out 
to them dominates the decrease in consumer surplus caused by the rise in the demand 
price.  As the per-unit tax is further increased, however, eventually tax revenues can fall 
(a Laffer-effect).  Thus, when the production tax is sufficiently high, increasing it can 
harm both producers and consumers-taxpayers.  In figure A.3.1, when the tax rises 
beyond the point that results in welfare outcome E, both consumers-taxpayers and 
producers are harmed by a further tax increase. 
 